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Abstract 
We study the dual relationship between market structure and prices and between market structure and 
investment in mobile telecommunications. Using a uniquely constructed panel of mobile operators’ 
prices and accounting information across 33 OECD countries between 2002 and 2014, we document 
that more concentrated markets lead to higher end user prices. Furthermore, they also lead to higher 
investment per mobile operator, though the impact on total investment is not conclusive. Our findings 
are not only relevant for the current consolidation wave in the telecommunications industry. More 
generally, they stress that competition and regulatory authorities should take seriously the potential 
trade-off between market power effects and efficiency gains stemming from agreements between 
firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Europe is experiencing a wave of merger activity in the telecommunications industry that may lead to a 
consolidation of the EU’s telecommunications market. In mobile telecommunications, in particular, the 
European Commission has recently cleared 4-to-3 mergers in the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland and 
Germany but its concerns regarding the impact on prices and competition have prevented a similar merger 
in Denmark in 2015. Another 4-to-3 merger in the UK was blocked in 2016, and yet another proposed 
merger in Italy has recently been approved by the European Commission (subject to a divestiture 
requirement). Earlier decisions had dealt with, and approved, 5-to-4 mergers in Austria, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. The debate extends beyond Europe. A 4-to-3 merger in Australia was approved 
in 2009. In the US, the federal regulator (FCC) blocked a merger between AT&T and T-Mobile in 2009 
and then indicated that it would not allow a merger between T-Mobile and Sprint in 2014. The latter deal 
may be reignited soon due to further changes in the US telecoms competitive landscape. 
These mergers have been discussed in the context of considerable debate regarding the relationship 
between market structure and market performance. Competition and regulatory authorities typically focus 
on the pricing implications of mergers, as they are concerned that increased concentration comes with 
higher prices for end users. However, authorities seem to have paid less attention to the impact that such 
mergers could have on efficiencies, and, especially, investments. Mobile operators argue that their revenues 
continue to decline due to increasing competition from global Internet players, such as Skype and 
WhatsApp, offering alternative services. At the same time, operators argue that they are investing large 
sums into their broadband networks to meet the demand for data traffic. Consolidation, via mergers, is for 
them an attempt to maintain profitability levels and keep up with investments. 
This debate is particularly prominent in the European Union, as the completion of the Digital Single 
Market (DSM) is one of the top priorities for the European Commission. In 2015, the Commission 
published a strategy outlining how it intends to achieve that goal, stating that the completion of the DSM 
“could contribute €415 billion per year to [the EU] economy and create 3.8 million jobs”.  A pillar of the 
3 
strategy is addressing “fragmentation” in the telecoms sector, and the resulting smaller scale of operation. 
While fragmentation has been identified as one of the factors behind the worse financial results of European 
telecoms companies compared to their US, Japanese and Korean counterparts, it has also been interpreted 
differently by different stakeholders. For the Commission, fragmentation relates to access availability, 
quality and prices that vary significantly across the continent, with telecoms markets defined by national 
borders. Mobile operators, instead, point to the fact that there are about 40 mobile network operators in the 
EU. Many operate in just one or two countries.  By comparison, in the US there are four nationwide mobile 
operators (AT&T, Verizon, Sprint and T-Mobile).  While the Commission would seem to be lenient in case 
there were cross-border mergers, the mobile operators appear more interested in achieving within-country 
consolidation. 
In this paper we study the relationship between prices, investments, and market structure in the mobile 
telecommunications industry. We use an empirical approach by looking at the experience of thirty-three 
countries in the period 2002-2014. We collect what is, to our knowledge, the largest dataset employed to-
date for works of this kind. A challenge in assembling a panel dataset like ours is to find relevant and 
comparable information at the operator level, between countries and over time. The dataset spans a time 
period long enough to capture changes in market structure: entry via licensing, exit via mergers and organic 
growth through changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index. This provides ideal variation in 
the data to assess how market structure impacts on prices and investments, holding other factors constant. 
Our panel data approach includes fixed effects to control for systematic differences between countries and 
general changes over time, and instrumental variables for the remaining endogeneity related to some of the 
variables used to proxy market concentration. While the variation in market structure over time is not only 
due to mergers, but also due to new entry and organic growth, we focus our conclusions mainly on the 
impact of mergers because this has recently received considerable policy attention. 
We find that an increase in market concentration in the mobile industry can potentially generate an 
important trade-off. While a merger will increase prices, investment per operator will also go up. Based on 
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our estimates, a hypothetical 4-to-3 symmetric merger would increase the bill of end users by 16.3% on 
average. At the same time investment per operator significantly increases by 19.3%, while total industry 
investment does not change significantly. Our evidence on the impact of concentration on total industry 
investment is therefore not entirely conclusive. On the one hand, it suggests that efficiencies are present, 
since theoretical models predict that total investment would decrease in the absence of efficiencies. But on 
the other hand, it is not clear whether efficiencies from coordinating total industry investment among fewer 
firms only stem from fixed costs savings, or whether they also involve marginal cost savings and quality 
improvements that benefit consumers. To shed further light on this, additional research is necessary with 
more complete data on the underlying investment components of all operators, or based on more in-depth 
individual case studies. 
Our findings are not only relevant for the current consolidation wave in the telecommunications industry. 
More generally, they also stress that competition and regulatory authorities should take seriously the 
potential trade-off between market power effects and efficiency gains stemming from agreements between 
firms. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. In Section 2 we relate our work to the existing literature, 
especially to price-concentration and investment-concentration studies. Section 3 describes how we 
matched different sources to construct the dataset. Section 4 motivates our empirical strategy to identify the 
causal relationship between market structure on the one hand, and prices and investments on the other hand. 
Section 5 presents the main results, while in Section 6 we conduct a detailed robustness analysis and several 
extensions. The limitations of our approach are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE
This paper is related to several streams in the literature. First and foremost, we belong to a long tradition in 
Industrial Organisation that has studied the relationship between market structure and performance, 
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typically proxied by profits and/or prices. Second, we are interested in the important link between market 
structure and investments, which is part of a much larger field that has studied innovation and market 
structure. Third, we are specifically interested in conducting an empirical study related to the mobile 
telecommunications industry, an important and dynamic industry and an active field of research. Finally, 
we contribute to work on the trade-off between market power and efficiency gains from mergers. 
2.1. Literature on market structure and performance 
A long stream of papers in economics examines the relationship between competitive features of a market 
and profitability. In the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of Industrial Organisation, this literature 
relies on cross-sectional data across industries to provide evidence on the impact of concentration on 
profitability. A general finding in this literature is that higher market shares and increased supplier 
concentration are associated with higher profitability (see for example, Schmalensee, 1989). The profit-
concentration studies have been criticised on several grounds. First, these studies are afflicted by 
measurement problems as accounting profits are poor indicators of economic profits. Second, the cross-
sectional data from different industries used in these works is challenging due to large differences in demand 
and supply conditions across industries. Finally, these studies are subject to the “efficiency” critique offered 
by Demsetz (1973), who argued that the positive correlation between profits and market concentration could 
be due to the superiority of a few firms. 
Over the past several decades, the profit-concentration studies have been replaced by related research that 
examines the relationship between market structure and prices, rather than profits. An advantage of using 
prices as opposed to profits is that they are not subject to accounting conventions, and they may be easier 
to obtain, often at a more detailed level of individual products sold by the firms. Weiss (1989) provides a 
collection of a large number of price-concentration studies and argues that, since prices are determined in 
the market, they are not subject to Demsetz’s critique. Furthermore, the majority of the price-concentration 
studies use data across local markets within an industry, rather than across industries, making comparisons 
easier. These studies include a wide range of industries such as groceries (Cotterill, 1986), banking (Calem 
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and Carlino, 1991), airlines (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), driving lessons (Asplund and Sandin, 1999), 
movie theatres (Davis, 2005), and the beer industry (Ashenfelter et al., 2015), to name just a few examples. 
Several studies have used price-concentration analysis to evaluate the effect of actual mergers on prices, 
for example in airlines (Borenstein, 1990; Kim and Singal, 1993), banking (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003), 
petroleum (Hastings, 2004; Gilbert and Hastings, 2005; Hosken et al., 2011), and appliances (Ashenfelter 
et al., 2013). 
A general finding in this price-concentration literature is that high concentration is associated with higher 
prices (Weiss, 1989; see also a more recent survey by Newmark, 2004). However, as pointed out by both 
Bresnahan (1989) and Schmalensee (1989) in their chapters in the Handbook of Industrial Organization, 
the price-concentration regressions, such as those used in the literature, suffer from endogeneity issues. In 
particular, there might be unobserved demand and cost shocks in a market that not only influence prices 
but also the underlying market structure. For instance, a market with unobserved high costs is likely to have 
higher prices, but these markets are also likely to attract fewer entrants. Evans et al. (1993) address this 
issue and propose a combination of fixed effects and instrumental variable procedures that are applicable 
when one has access to panel data, as we do. They study the price-concentration relationship in the airline 
industry and find that the effect of concentration on price is severely biased using OLS procedures. 
As Whinston (2008) points out, price-concentration analysis is one of the most commonly used econometric 
techniques employed by competition authorities when analysing horizontal mergers. Similarly, Baker and 
Rubinfeld (1999) note that “reduced form price equations are the workhorse empirical methods for antitrust 
litigation”.  The bias in the parameters capturing market structure and competitive interactions can therefore 
have important policy implications. 
2.2. Literature on competition and innovation/investment 
There is a broad on the relationship between competition and innovation (see Nickell, 1996; Aghion et al., 
2005; Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion and Griffith 2006; Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012). The existing empirical 
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studies on this subject face the issue that the relationship between competition and innovation is 
endogenous, i.e., market structure may not only affect innovation but the reverse is also possible (Jaffe, 
2000; Hall and Harho, 2012). We take advantage of two features in our data. First, changes in competition 
due to mergers occurred at different points in time across countries, or did not occur at all in other countries. 
This enables us to conduct a difference in differences analysis. Second, various regulatory interventions 
affected both entry and growth in the telecommunications market (see later the discussion on termination 
rate regulation). This allows us to construct instrumental variables that address remaining endogeneity 
concerns regarding our competition measure. 
While the literature cited above is empirical, we note that there are also several theoretical works that study 
the relationship between competition and innovation (or investments). In the absence of spill-overs, Vives 
(2008) finds that investment per firm tends to decrease as the number of firms in a market increases,  while 
industry investment tends to increase as the number of firms increases. Schmutzler (2013) extends Vives’ 
model to an asymmetric setting and shows that the opposite result can hold true in the presence of a firm 
that is particularly efficient. Summarising the literature, Gilbert (2006) concludes that – broadly speaking 
– competition produces greater innovation incentives under exclusive rights to innovation, while non-
exclusive rights generally lead to the opposite conclusion. We also observe that there is a surprisingly 
limited body of theoretical work specifically on the impact of mergers on innovation, with recent 
contributions by Motta and Tarantino (2016) and Marshall and Parra (2016) being notable exceptions. In 
particular, Motta and Tarantino (2016) find that in the absence of economies of scope, mergers reduce total 
industry investment. 
2.3. Literature on the mobile telecommunications industry 
Work more specific to the mobile telecommunications industry has investigated several related questions. 
Some papers have studied the early stages of diffusion and focused on technology ‘generations’ (e.g., 
1G/2G/3G), industry standards, and entry regulation (see, e.g., Gruber and Verboven, 2001a,b; Liikanen et 
al., 2004; Koski and Kretschmer, 2005; and Grajeck and Kretschmer, 2009). Typically, these works do not 
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explicitly address the question of the impact of market structure on diffusion. An exception is Gruber and 
Verboven (2001a,b) who include a duopoly dummy variable which they find to be statistically significant 
but quantitatively small. Liikanen et al. (2004) include two market structure variables: the number of firms 
and a 3-firm Herfindahl index; neither is found to be statistically significant. A limitation of these papers is 
that they refer to data from the 90s, which were still quite early in the diffusion process. Using more recent 
data, but following the same spirit of looking at the process of mobile diffusion, Li and Lyons (2012) find 
that both the number of networks, and the history of market structure, matter for the speed of consumer 
uptake. This market structure effect does not work only through the level of prices. Digital technology, 
standardisation, privatisation and independent regulation are also important positive factors in their study. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any published academic study that relates market 
structure to investments in the mobile telecommunications industry. While some policy reports exist (e.g., 
OECD, 2014; Frontier Economics, 2015; HSBC, 2015), the academic literature so far has investigated 
investment matters only in the fixed telecommunications industry, where the focus is, however, typically 
different. A key question in fixed telecommunications, which is however less central in mobile 
telecommunications, is one-way access of new entrants to the infrastructure of the incumbent fixed-line 
operator (see, e.g., Greenstein and Mazzeo, 2006; Economides et al. 2008; Xiao and Orazem, 2009, 2011; 
Grajek and Roeller, 2012; and Nardotto et al., 2015). 
2.4. Market power and efficiency gains from mergers 
In an influential article, Williamson (1968) argued that mergers only need small efficiency gains to 
compensate for market power effects from mergers. Most competition authorities have however followed 
a consumer surplus standard, emphasizing that (i) efficiencies should consist of marginal cost savings in 
order to be passed on into consumer prices; and (ii) efficiencies should be merger-specific, i.e., could not 
have occurred in the absence of the merger (see the Guidelines of the European Commission (2004) and 
for an earlier review Röller, Stennek and Verboven (2001). 
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There is very little empirical work that explicitly examines the trade-off between market power and 
efficiency gains from increases in concentration, whether from a welfare or from a consumer surplus 
perspective. One notable exceptions is Focarelli and Panetta (2003). They find that mergers in the Italian 
banking sector benefited consumers as they raised consumer deposit rates in the long run, and they attribute 
this to cost savings.  And, more recently, Ashenfelter et al. (2105) find that the increase in concentration in 
the US brewing industry due to the merger between the second and third largest firms in the industry led to 
an increase in pricing that was nearly exactly offset by efficiencies created by the merger. 
Our study on the impact of concentration on both prices and investment can shed further light on the trade-
off between market power and efficiency gains from increased concentration. We cannot do this directly, 
as we do not observe efficiency gains. Nevertheless, our information on investment provides indirect 
evidence, which we can interpret based on theoretical work by, for example, Vives (2008) and Motta and 
Tarantino (2016).  In particular, these analyses imply that, if mergers do not reduce industry investment, 
then they most involve efficiencies. Such efficiencies may stem from simply saving duplicated fixed costs 
(in which case it benefits welfare but not consumers). But they may also come from other benefits of 
coordinating investment within a firm, such as marginal cost savings or quality improvements. Whether 
such benefits are in the interest of consumers is a question we will not be able to address with our analysis. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND MARKET TRENDS
Our empirical analysis focuses on the link between measures of market concentration, tariffs paid by end 
users, and investments carried out by mobile operators. 
3.1. Data description 
We focus on a large panel of OECD countries over the period 2002-2014. We combine data on prices of 
mobile baskets and operators’ market shares, with information on their investments and profitability as well 
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as information on the interconnection prices (termination rates) operators pay to each other for termination 
of calls. 
We matched three different data sources for our analysis that we now describe. 
3.1.1. Prices 
We used Teligen to obtain quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers across operators and 
countries (2002Q3-2014Q2). Teligen collects and compares all available tariffs of the two largest mobile 
operators for thirty-four OECD countries. Teligen constructs different consumer usage profiles (e.g., large, 
medium and low users) based on the number of calls and messages, the average call length and the time 
and type of call.  A distinction between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) prices is also 
accounted for, as this is an important industry characteristic. These consumer profiles are then held fixed 
when looking across countries and time. 
Several remarks on the methodology are in order. First, the prices used are not actual bills, but hypothetical 
bills representing the consumers’ best choice for that usage profile. Empirical work with actual billing data 
has shown that in practice consumers do not always choose their best tariff plan, but they do not necessarily 
make permanent mistakes (see Miravete, 2003, and Miravete and Palacios-Huerta, 2014, who establish this 
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of past choices). 
Second, the Teligen dataset only reports tariff data, and does not provide information on implicit discounts 
from subsidized handsets in the case of post-paid contract prices. Handset subsidies were especially 
common during the 90s, but less so after 2005. To the extent that these deals were still common across 
operators within a country, their effect would be captured by the country and time fixed effects. Moreover, 
there is no reason to expect that handset subsidies changed particularly due to mergers. We verified our 
results using different subsamples (after 2006 and 2010) indicating the results are robust to these 
perturbations. We also did a sensitivity analysis by looking at pre-paid and post-paid separately, as pre-paid 
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tariffs are not likely to be affected in any significant fashion by handset subsidies. This gave similar 
conclusions though the standard errors increase due to the reduced number of observations. 
Third, while it is common to use fixed consumer profiles or consumption baskets to compare prices, it is 
subject to several related biases, relating to substitution, quality improvements and new product 
introduction. See, for example, Hausman (2003) for a discussion. Our approach to this issue has been to 
perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to alternative baskets, as discussed below. 
The Teligen dataset has three main advantages. First, the information reported is about consumers’ monthly 
bills, contrary to other metrics (such as average revenue per user) that confound several sources of revenues 
for the operator paid by different parties. Second, by fixing a priori the calling profiles of customers, it 
provides us with information on the best choices of these customers across countries and time, and accounts 
for possible heterogeneity in the calling profiles. Third, the prices reported in this dataset include much of 
the relevant information for this industry, such as inclusive minutes, quantity discounts, discounts to special 
numbers, etc. (although it does not include handset subsidies). However, this richness of information comes 
at the cost of having data for only the two biggest operators of every country at each point in time. This 
reduces the variability and can make identification of our variables of interest harder. Moreover, examining 
a decade long of consumer behaviour in such a dynamic industry such as the telecommunications industry, 
would perhaps call into question the stability of the customer profiles throughout the whole period. Indeed, 
Teligen adjusted the calling profiles of its customers, first set in 2002, in 2006, and then again in 2010 and 
in 2012. The 2002 basket includes voice and SMS for a consumer profile that is most representative in 
2002. The 2006 and 2010 baskets again includes voice and SMS, but for updated consumer profiles that 
are most representative in 2006 and 2010, respectively. Finally, the 2012 basket also includes data. We will 
focus our main analysis on the 2006-2014 period, where we allow the basket to change in 2010 and 2012 
(hence the tariffs include data in the last subperiod). Nevertheless, we have considered an extensive 
sensitivity analysis, such as keeping the 2006 basket fixed throughout the entire period, or considering the 
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entire period with various basket definitions. This gave robust conclusions, as we discuss in Sections 6 and 
7. 
3.1.2. Market structure and investments 
The second main dataset is the quarterly information taken from the Global Wireless Matrix of the Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch dataset (henceforth, BoAML). BoAML reports a wealth of data, namely: 
Market structure: number of mobile network operators, and total number of subscribers per operator. From 
the latter, we can compute market shares, as well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
concentration, which is the sum of the squares of market shares. As in other studies, the HHI is based on 
the installed base of subscribers, i.e., the stock of previous and recently acquired customers. Some 
information on operators’ recently acquired customers is available. But this information is incomplete, and 
the HHI based on the entire stock of customers is a better proxy for the overall level of market competition. 
Our market structure variables are based on the traditional mobile network operators (MNOs), i.e., those 
operators who obtained a licence to use the spectrum. In recent years, MNOs started to provide access to 
their network by so-called mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). These operators only compete at 
the retail level, and their overall impact on competition has been subject to debate. We do not have 
information on the number of MVNOs or their market shares. If such information becomes available 
systematically, it would be interesting to investigate how they have influenced the impact of the recent 
mergers between MNOs. 
Finally, the dataset also reports the time when the entry license was granted to each operator. We also 
compute indicators of cumulative entry in each market, that is, the cumulative number of entrants since 
2000, and similarly for cumulative exit. 
Financial indicators: BoAML compiles quarterly basic operating metrics for mobile operators in over fifty 
countries. For our purposes, we use, first and foremost, capital expenditure (CAPEX), that is, money 
invested by an operator to acquire or upgrade fixed, physical, non-consumable assets, such as cell sites or 
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equipment. This is going to be our proxy for investments. We will also use, at times, earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), which is a good accounting metric for operators’ 
profits, as well as EBITDA margins, which are informative about the profitability of an operator expressed 
as a percentage of revenues (hence forming an accounting proxy for the Lerner index). Finally, we also 
look at the quarterly reported average revenue per user (ARPU), as this is often mentioned in the policy 
debate. Note that, contrary to the Teligen dataset, the BoAML dataset in principle contains information for 
all operators in a given country. 
Finally, we also collected information on GDP per capita and population in each country and period. 
3.1.3. Mobile termination rates 
Mobile operators charge other network operators (fixed or mobile) for connecting calls to their subscribers 
– the so called mobile termination rates (MTRs). Using mainly Cullen International, but also various other
industry and regulatory publications, we were in a position to identify the level of MTRs both before and 
after its regulation, and to identify the dates in which MTR regulation was introduced across countries and 
operators. 
The final dataset comprises 33 countries and more than 7,000 observations for the period 2002-2014.  Table 
1 provides some key summary statistics for the main variables. The top panel shows the summary statistics 
for the price data set, for the entire period 2002-2014 (first three columns), and for the period 2006-2014 
(last three columns). The bottom panel shows the analogue summary statistics for the investment data set. 
Our analysis focuses on the period 2006-2014, while we also consider the entire period in the robustness 
section. Note that both samples contain the same set of countries and quarters, but the samples sizes differ 
because the unit of observation within a country/quarter differs: for prices, the unit of observation is the 
usage type for the largest two operators, while for investment it is simply the operator. As a result, the 
number of observations is larger for the price data than for the investment data. 
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According to the top panel of Table 1, the average price (or bill) of a basket during 2006-2014 was 565 
euro per year, with a standard deviation of 3,328 euro. This reflects variation across countries and over 
time, but also variation between the three user profiles (low = 179, medium = 498 and high = 1018 euros 
per year) of the two largest operators for which we have information. The average number of competitors 
during this period was 3.6, where 34.3% of the observations refer to markets with 4 competitors and 7.8% 
to markets with 5 or more competitors (and the remaining 57.9% referring the markets with 2, or much 
more frequently 3, competitors). The HHI was on average 0.359 on a 0 to 1 scale (or 3,590 on the common 
0 to 10,000 scale). Finally, we report information on control variables such as GDP per capita (on average 
41,182 euros per year), the mobile termination rate (on average 0.087 euros per minute) and the difference 
in the MTRs of the least regulated operator and the most regulated operator in each country and period (on 
average 0.301). 
According to the bottom panel of Table 1, investment per operator (CAPEX) had a quarterly average of 
$165 million post-2005, compared with average profits (EBITDA) of $386 million, with considerable 
variation between operators, across countries and over time. Operator EBITDA margins were on average 
34.9% and monthly average revenue per user (ARPU) was $32.8. The information on the control variables 
is comparable to what we reported for our price analysis in the top panel of Table 1. 
3.2. Market developments 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of mobile tariffs (overall and by consumer profile) during 2006Q1-2014Q1, 
using normalized (at the beginning of the period) demeaned average prices across countries and operators. 
Overall prices steadily declined by almost 50% during this period, amounting to an average decline of 2.2% 
per quarter. Prices by consumer profile followed a similar pattern with prices for the large bundles falling 
faster than those for the smaller ones. 
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of the demeaned average investment (CAPEX), profits (EBITDA and 
EBITDA margin) and average revenue per user (ARPU) across countries and operators. Investment 
(CAPEX) has gradually increased (with seasonal peaks in the last quarter of each year). Profits (EBITDA) 
increased by about 25% until 2011Q3, but then started to decline again to eventually reach the same level 
as in the first quarter of our data. This may be due to a gradual decline in average revenue per user across 
the period, insufficiently compensated by a growth in the number of subscribers as markets matured. 
Finally, notice that average percentage EBITDA margins remained fairly stable across the period. 
Table 2 shows the evolution of the number of competing operators across the countries in our data set. In 
most countries there are three firms, but there is considerable variation across countries and over time. 
Because of new firm entry, no country is left with only two operators. At the same time there has been exit 
through mergers that has reduced the number of countries with five operators. 
These trends illustrate that there have been considerable changes in our main variables of interest: tariffs, 
investment and the number of competitors. This variation is not just limited to the time dimension; it is also 
present at the country and operator level, as our summary statistics in Table 1 suggests. This provides the 
necessary information to study the impact of market structure on prices and investments. Nevertheless, we 
should be cautious in accounting for general trends (or fluctuations), as we are interested in identifying the 
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impact of market structure over and above any historical trends. We discuss how we do this in the next 
section, where we introduce our empirical framework. 
4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We adopt a panel data approach with fixed effects for countries and time periods, and instrumental variables 
for remaining endogeneity regarding the market structure variable. We first outline the specifications for 
prices and investment (section 4.1), and then provide a more detailed motivation where we address possible 
endogeneity issues (section 4.2). 
4.1. Specification 
For our empirical analysis on prices, we estimate the following equation: 
(1) lnPuoct = αuoc + αt + β1 Mkt_Strct + β2 Charuoct + εuoct. 
The dependent variable in eq. (1) is the logarithm of (euros PPP adjusted) retail prices (lnPuoct) paid by a 
customer with the usage profile u = {low, medium, high} and subscribing to mobile operator o in country 
c in quarter t. Time fixed effects (αt) and usage-operator-country fixed effects (αuoc) control for global trends 
and for time-invariant usage-operator-country characteristics, respectively. The vector Charuoct includes 
several control variables that may influence prices and vary across tariffs, operators or countries. 
Specifically, we include a dummy variable for whether the tariff is post-paid (instead of pre-paid), the 
logarithm of GDP per capita, the logarithm of the mobile termination rate to account for a possible 
“waterbed effect” of regulation, and the logarithm of the mobile terminate rate interacted with a time trend 
to account for a possible declining effect as fixed-to-mobile calls have decreased in importance over time 
(Genakos and Valletti, 2011, 2015). The main variable of interest, Mkt_Strct, is an indicator of the market 
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structure in country c in quarter t. In particular, we use two alternative indicators of market structure: the 
number of operators, Nct, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHIct, in country c in quarter t. 
We estimate the model in first-differences to eliminate the large set of usage-operator-country fixed effects 
(αuoc). While a within-transformation would achieve the same purpose, the first-difference approach is more 
appropriate here because of the presence of serial correlation in the error terms εuoct. Estimated standard 
errors are clustered at the usage-operator-country level. 
Note that when our market structure variable refers to discrete events (number of firms), our empirical 
model can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator, allowing for different control groups at 
different points in time (similar to recent retrospective merger studies, e.g., Ashenfelter, Hosken and 
Weinberg (2013; 2015)).  In the special case of a panel with only two countries and two time periods, our 
model simplifies to a standard difference-in-differences estimator, where one estimates the effect of a 
change in market structure in one country relative to a control country where no change occurred. Our panel 
data model with multiple periods and countries can also be interpreted as a difference-in-differences 
estimator, with some additional structure to identify the effects (by allowing for different control groups at 
different points in time). In particular, the information for multiple periods enables us to account for the 
possibility of country-specific trends, as in Card (1992) or Besley and Burgess (2004) or as discussed in 
Angrist and Pischke (2009). We will consider this in an extension of our analysis. 
When we turn to the analysis on operator investment, we estimate the following equation: 
(2) lnCAPEXoct = αc + αt + β1 Mkt_Strct + β2 Op_Charoct + εoct, 
where the dependent variable is now the logarithm of Capex of mobile operator o in country c in quarter t. 
We include time fixed effects (αt) to account for general trends and especially seasonal effects, and country 
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fixed effects (αc) to account for systematic differences between countries. The vector Op_Charoct includes 
several variables that may affect investment and that may vary across operators and/or time. First, we 
include dummy variables for the order of entry (first, second and third entrant relative to the remaining 
operators).  Second, we include a variable to indicate the time since the operator first entered. These 
variables capture the fact that first-movers who are in the market for a long time may have different 
incentives to invest than late movers which entered more recently. Third, we include the logarithm of GDP 
per capita.  We estimate the model using fixed effects (and not first-differences) because Capex is most 
often lumpy and not serially correlated (although it does show seasonal variation, for which we control). 
We also considered a dynamic specification as in Grajek and Röller (2009), but the lagged variables were 
insignificant. Estimated standard errors are clustered at the country-operator level. 
We also present results for alternative measures of the outcome of interest in eq. (2). First, instead of 
investment in absolute terms we consider investment relative to the total market size (CAPEXoct divided by 
the total number of subscribers). This may better capture the fact that investment needs increase with market 
size (even though we already control for country fixed effects). Second, we replace investment (CAPEXoct) 
in eq. (2) by alternative performance measures EBITDAoct, (EBITDA margin)oct, and ARPUoct, respectively. 
Finally, we also consider an analysis of total industry investment at the country level, based on the following 
specification: 
(3) lnTOTCAPEXct = αc + αt + β1 Mkt_Strct + β2 Mkt_Charct + εct, 
The dependent variable is now the logarithm of total industry Capex across all mobile operators in country 
c in quarter t. Since Capex is not observed for some operators, we adjusted total industry Capex by dividing 
by the total market share of the operators for which we have Capex information. We again include time 
fixed effects (αt) and country fixed effects (αc). The vector Mkt_Charct includes the logarithm of GDP per 
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capita and the logarithm of population (as measures of potential market size). As for the operator investment 
equation, we estimate the model using a within transformation (fixed effects). Finally, we cluster the 
standard errors at the country level. 
We also considered alternative measures of industry performance outcomes at the country level, where we 
replace TOTCAPEXct in (3) by TOTEBITDAct (again adjusted by the market share) and total mobile 
subscription penetration. 
4.2. Possible endogeneity concerns 
Our empirical framework includes a full set of country and time fixed effects. The country fixed effects 
control for country-specific factors that may be responsible for systematically higher prices or higher 
investment in certain countries. Hence, we identify the impact of market structure on prices and investment 
from changes that occur within a country, and assume that the timing of new entry or merger is not 
correlated with the error term. As discussed above, when we use the number of operators as our market 
structure variable, we essentially have a difference-in-differences approach, which considers the impact of 
a change in market structure in the treatment countries, relative to the control countries, on performance 
(prices and investment). A potential concern is that there may be remaining endogeneity regarding the 
market structure variables, despite the inclusion of a full set of country and time fixed effects. This concern 
is especially relevant when we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, instead of the number of firms, as our 
market structure proxy. We discuss both in turn. 
4.2.1. Number of firms 
The mobile industry is not a free-entry industry. Rather, operators must be awarded spectrum licenses, and 
when a merger or an exit occurs, new operators still need to obtain licenses. 
A big source of variation in the number of licence holders in the data comes in particular from the award 
of third generation (3G) licences in the early 2000s. Spectrum is typically assigned in a two-step process. 
First, spectrum is allocated for a certain use (e.g., broadcasting, mobile, or satellite); second, licences are 
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assigned to operators. The first step is most relevant for our purposes, as it determines how many licenses 
are granted in each country. Börgers and Dustmann (2003) consider the first allocation step in the context 
of the European 3G auctions. They discuss how EU countries were constrained by binding decisions made 
by the International Telecommunication Union and by the EU, so that each country had to allocate a fixed 
amount of spectrum for mobile 3G services (60 MHz of paired spectrum and 25 MHz of unpaired spectrum). 
The assignment also had to be conducted in a certain timeframe. The amount of spectrum implied that 
between 4 and 5 licences could be assigned. What is relevant for our purposes is that the status quo in the 
various countries was very heterogeneous, with some countries having only two 2G licence holders 
(Luxembourg), and other countries having already five 2G licence holders (the Netherlands). In all these 
countries, the country-specific timing at which these licenses were granted differed, because of 
idiosyncrasies in the assignment process. Similarly, when mergers started to take place in more recent years, 
there were differences in the timing of these events. 
Börgers and Dustmann (2003) also argue that the determinants of the number of licences did not appear to 
be correlated with particular market characteristics, as it was affected by a wealth of political decisions as 
well as by idiosyncratic events that seemed largely random. For instance, the Swedish government (with 
three 2G incumbents) decided to award licences in a beauty contest. It first announced officially that it 
would issue five licences, but then reduced them down to four. By contrast, the UK (with four incumbents) 
chose auctions from the start, making four licences available at first, and then increasing them to five. The 
objectives pursued by governments were not clear, as was not also the direction in which operators would 
want to influence the political decisions. Government’s choices over spectrum allocations are a fascinating 
topic that would deserve further investigation. For our purposes, we emphasise that there is no evidence of 
particular patterns that are related to mobile prices or investments. This is in favour of our assumption of 
exogeneity of the number of operators in a market, conditional on the full set of country and time fixed 
effects that we include in our specification. 
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Our specification is however still subject to criticism on two grounds. First, the variable Nct changes both 
because of new entry and because of mergers, and it is possible that the impact is asymmetric. In recognition 
of this issue, in the empirical analysis we will treat differently changes in market structure due to entry that 
typically reduce concentration from those due to mergers that increase concentration. 
Second, Nct in practice takes a limited number of values (see Table 2), which makes the effects harder to 
identify. For this reason, we also use a second indicator of market structure, HHIct, which shows 
considerably more variation, especially some very useful within-country variation. This variable will 
require instruments, since it can no longer be treated as exogenous conditional on the fixed effects. 
4.2.2. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
The HHI is a flexible indicator of market structure but suffers from endogeneity concerns, as market shares 
depend on prices and on investments. To account for this endogeneity, we follow an instrumental variable 
approach. As such, our framework is also closely related to a recent paper by Blake et al. (2015), who 
investigate the relationship between advertising and sales using time and region fixed effects and an 
additional instrument for advertising. 
First, we use the difference in the MTRs of the least regulated operator and the most regulated operator in 
country c in period t (MTR_Diffct). MTRs are the payments that an operator has to face when it wants to 
terminate a call off-net, that is, on a rival’s network. These charges are also known as two-way access 
charges in the literature that started with seminal contributions of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. 
(1998). If left unregulated, every operator would have a unilateral incentive to monopolise the termination 
of calls it receives. Hence regulators world-wide have intervened repeatedly in the market for call 
termination. These interventions have differed widely, both within and between countries, a source of 
variation we can exploit in our search of a valid instrument. 
We take advantage not only of the different timing of the introduction of regulation across countries, but 
also of the widespread variation on the rates imposed across operators within countries. This variation in 
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regulated MTRs was particularly evident in countries where there was a large asymmetry between the 
“large” incumbents and the “small” entrants. In practice, regulators have been more reluctant in cutting the 
MTRs of the new entrants. They did this, most likely, with the idea of helping them secure a stronger 
position in the market. Thus, while the level of MTRs may affect prices (and which we therefore do not use 
as an exclusion restriction), the difference in MTRs between the most and least regulated operator should 
not directly affect prices (especially not those of the large incumbent operators that are reported in the 
Teligen price dataset). However, one may expect that the difference in MTRs should boost the market 
shares of the smaller operators and hence reduce the HHI. In sum, the difference in regulated MTRs does 
not have a direct impact on prices (given that the level of MTRs is included as an explanatory variable), but 
it may have an indirect impact through the HHI. This is also confirmed by a theoretical literature than has 
looked directly into the asymmetric regulation of MTRs, whereby the regulation of the entrant would be 
more lenient than the regulation of incumbents, causing the entrant to capture a larger market share in this 
fashion (Peitz, 2005). 
Second, following the logic of the previous sub-section: (i) we use binary indicators for the number of 
competitors to take advantage of the regulated nature of entry and exit in this industry, and (ii) we use two 
separate variables to measure separately cumulative entry and exit of operators in each country to proxy the 
differential impact of entry and exit in market concentration. 
5. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we discuss the main results on the effects on prices (subsection 5.1) and investment 
(subsection 5.2). In the next section we report the results of a detailed robustness analysis, including 
alternative performance measures. 
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Table 3 shows the results from estimating the price equation (1), for alternative measures of market 
structure. These results are based on the sample of prices for all countries in our dataset post-2005, where 
we allow for varying baskets to account for changes in user profiles (such as an increased use of data in 
recent years): the 2006 basket for the period 2006-2009, the 2010 basket for the period 2010-2011 and the 
2012 basket for the period 2012-2014. 
Column 1 uses the number of competitors as a measure of market structure. The results show that one more 
competitor leads to a price reduction of approximately 8.6%. However, this specification is restrictive since 
it assumes the same percentage effect as the number of operators’ increases, irrespective of the total number 
of competitors. Column 2 allows the effect of the number of entrants to vary non-parametrically. This shows 
that prices decrease by about 15.9% in markets with four operators compared with the comparison group 
of two or three operators. In markets with five or more operators, prices are reduced by 7.9% with a new 
entry, but the effect is estimated rather imprecisely (standard error of 6.3%). Column 3 allows for 
asymmetric effects of entry and exit, using variables that measure the cumulative net entry or cumulative 
net exit since 2000. Cumulative entry is typically related to new licenses being awarded, while exit is 
typically associated with mergers. Results in column 3 show that a net entry reduces prices by about 9.3%, 
whereas a net exit increases prices by only 4.3% (with significance at the 10% level). One possible 
interpretation of this finding is that exit due to a merger mainly occurs between smaller firms, whereas entry 
may gradually result in a new, larger firm, who may price aggressively to acquire market share. An 
additional possible explanation of this asymmetric effect is that mergers are scrutinised and approved by 
authorities, who may impose pro-competitive remedies to clear the mergers. 
The previous results are informative, but they do not account well for the impact of entry and mergers of 
different sizes. Accounting for different sizes is particularly interesting to evaluate the effects of specific 
mergers. For this reason, the last two columns show the effects of increases in concentration based on the 
HHI index. As discussed, we account for the endogeneity of the HHI using the difference between the 
highest and lowest mobile termination rate (MTR_Diffct) as an instrument. In addition, in column 4 we use 
5.1. Price results 
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binary indicators for the number of competitors, whereas in column 5 we use the cumulative entry and exit 
variables as additional instruments. First stage coefficients, presented in the Appendix (Table A1, columns 
1 and 2), all have the expected sign and the instruments are very powerful: the F-test on the excluded 
instruments is above 30 in column 4 and above 50 in column 5 of Table 3. 
Both specifications show that an increase in the HHI has a positive and significant impact on prices: 2.037 
in column 4, and 2.529 in column 5.  To illustrate, according to the first case in column 4, an increase in 
the HHI by 10 percentage points (for example from 0.3 to 0.4) would increase prices by 20.37%. Similarly, 
a 4-to-3 merger in a symmetric industry (raising the HHI by 8 percentage points from 0.25 to 0.33), would 
increase prices by 16.3%.  This is an average effect based on the sample of all countries post-2005. While 
this effect is statistically significant, it has a relatively wide 90% confidence interval, between 7.9% and 
24.7%. This may reflect the fact that the merger effects depend on specific circumstances in a country at a 
certain point in time.  How important is this effect against the background of the general price drop of 47% 
over the same period of eight years? Given that the price trend is -2.2% per quarter, a hypothetical merger 
that increases the HHI by 10 percentage points is roughly equivalent to going back to the price level of 
about 8 or 9 quarters ago. 
The rest of the control variables in Table 3 are in line with expectations. First, the pre-paid dummy is not 
significant, indicating that the impact of market structure on post-paid and pre-paid prices is on average 
equivalent. This is not surprising since Teligen selects the best possible prices across pre and post-paid 
contracts within each user profile. Second, changes in GDP per capita over time and across countries do 
not have a significant impact on prices over and above possible effects from systematic cross-country 
variation. Again this is to be expected given the extensive set of country-operator-usage and time control 
variables. Third, the mobile termination rates have a significant effect on prices, though this effect declines 
over time.  These findings are consistent with recent findings of Genakos and Valletti (2015): they also find 
a significant but declining waterbed effect, which they attribute to a fundamental change in the telecoms 
market. While in the early years, most calls to mobile phones would be made from fixed lines, more recently 
25 
mobile voice traffic has overtaken fixed line call volumes, changing the economic forces that give rise to 
the waterbed effect. 
5.2. Investment results 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating the investment equation (2) at the operator level, for alternative 
measures of market structure. As for our price analysis, these results are based on the sample of all countries 
in our dataset post-2005. According to column 1, each additional competitor reduces investment per 
operator by about 10.7%. The impact of entry may depend on the number of entrants. As column 2 shows, 
in markets with four operators, investment per operator is 18.3% lower than in the comparison group of 
markets with two or three operators. Furthermore, in markets with five or more operators, investment per 
operator is 25.3%, or an additional 7%, lower. Column 3 shows that a new entrant has a stronger negative 
effect on investment than the positive effect on investment associated with exit, though the effects are 
estimated imprecisely. 
The last two columns of Table 4 show the results based on the HHI measure of concentration. The results 
from the first stage regression of the HHI on our instruments (shown in Table A1, columns 3 and 4, in the 
Appendix) are comparable to what we found before (though not identical since the two samples differ 
somewhat). An increase in the HHI by 10 percentage points raises investment per operator by 24.1% using 
the first instrument set (column 4) and by 27.9% using the second instrument set (column 5). In both cases, 
the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Perhaps more concretely, a 4-to-3 merger in a symmetric 
industry (raising the HHI by 8 percentage points) would raise investment per operator by about 19.3% 
(under the first instrument set). This suggests that increases in concentration involve a trade-off: on the one 
hand operators in more concentrated markets raise prices, but on the other hand, they also increase 
investments. 
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The control variables show that the order of entry matters to some extent, as the first, second and third 
entrants invest more than the comparison group (fourth and fifth entrants). The effects are, however, only 
significant at the 10% level, and there do not appear to be significant differences between the first three 
entrants. Similarly, the time since first entry does not seem to affect investment levels. GDP per capita has 
a significant and strong, nearly proportional effect on investment. For example, based on the results in 
column 4, an increase in GDP per capita by 1% raises the investment of an operator by 0.89%. 
From a policy perspective it is also interesting to evaluate the investment at the country level. To do so we 
aggregate investment at the country level weighting it by each operator market share to account for the fact 
that we do not have data on several, mainly small operators. This considerably reduces the size of our 
dataset and the aggregation also eliminates all the across mobile operators variability, leaving only the 
across country variation. Table 5 reports the results. GDP per capita is estimated to increase total industry 
investment, consistent with our earlier finding on investment per operator. Market size has a negative effect, 
suggesting some economies of scale, but its effect is not significant most likely due to limited variation of 
population over time. 
Regarding the main variables of interest, the first three measures of competition suggest that there is a 
negative effect of entry on total investment, but the effect is not statistically significant. According to our 
last measure, the HHI index, there is a positive relation between concentration and industry investment, but 
again the effect is estimated imprecisely (columns 4 and 5).  The imprecise estimates may be due to the fact 
that investment is a noisier variable than prices, but also due to the reliance on cross country variability 
only. Further research on more detailed investment or network quality and performance measures may give 
more conclusive results. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that theoretical work has shown that an 
increase in concentration would lead to a decrease in total industry investment in the absence of efficiencies 
(Vives, 2008; Motta and Tarantino, 2016). Hence, our finding that concentration has no effect on industry 
investment suggests that there may at least be fixed cost savings, and possibly benefits to consumers from 
coordinating investment among fewer firms. 
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5.3. Merger effects in specific cases 
To better understand the economic significance of our previous findings we consider what the model 
predicts for three actual mergers that took place in Europe during our sample. In particular, we consider 
two mergers from 4 to 3 in Austria and the Netherlands that materialized in 2013 and 2007 respectively, 
and a merger from 5 to 4 in the UK in 2010. Table 6 provides various market details about the three mergers 
as well as our calculations for the predicted price and investment effects in these cases. Since the three 
considered mergers are all European and took place after 2005, we base the calculations on the estimates 
of a specification which is identical to eq. (1) and eq. (2) but includes only the European countries after 
2005 (see Tables A2, column 5 and Table A7, column 3, discussed in detail in the next section). 
In Austria, the mobile operator Orange (with a market share of 19%) sold its business to 3-Hutchinson (with 
a market share of 11%). This resulted in an increase in the HHI by 6.4% points. The model predicts that 
this leads to a price increase by 6.6% and an increase in investment per operator by 13.3%, though in both 
cases the 90% confidence intervals support the possibility of only a small increase, or fairly large increases 
up to 12.2% and 25.5%, respectively. In the UK, the 5 to 4 merger between T-Mobile and Orange had a 
comparable impact on the HHI (+6.9% points), so that the predicted price and investment increases are 
comparable to those in Austria, +6.9% and 13.9% respectively. Finally, in the Netherlands the merger 
between the same firms had a lower impact on the HHI (+3.6% points), so that the predicted impact is about 
half as large as in the other two countries, + 3.7% on prices and +7.5% on investment. 
In principle, we could compare these predicted merger effects with the actual effects. However, simply 
calculating average prices in affected countries before and after the event would not provide a meaningful 
comparison as it would not take into consideration the underlying, unrelated to mergers, trends affecting 
both prices and investment. To accurately estimate the merger effect we would need to construct a case-
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specific control group for each country and take an appropriate time window around the event so that it is 
not affected by any other changes in market structure. Instead of doing this on each merger event separately, 
here we use the entire panel to identify and quantify the effects. It is interesting to note that a recent study 
by Aguzzoni et al. (2015), which follows this methodology and looks at the merger between T-Mobile and 
Orange in the Netherlands in 2007, estimates a 10%-17% increase in prices.  To further understand 
heterogeneity in market structure effects, it would be interesting to see more case studies in future research, 
perhaps also using alternative methods such as structural approaches. In Box 1 we describe how the entry 
of Free in the French market has affected competition. 
BOX 1. The effect of entry on price – The case of Free in the French market 
In principle, our model may be used to assess the impact of entry in specific cases. A prominent recent case 
has been the entry by Free as the fourth operator in the French market. In practice, our model does not seem 
suitable to assess this case, because the entry of Free had effects that go beyond the traditional pre-paid and 
post-paid prices of the largest two operators (which is what we based our econometric analysis on). As 
such, the impact of this fourth operator was more disruptive than the impact of the third operator, Bouygues, 
which was introduced many years earlier. 
Free started its commercial launch in the French market in January 2012. It introduced contract-free post-
paid tariff plans, much different from the traditional post-paid plans which came with at least an annual 
contractual commitment. Free offered these plans at low prices, and the three incumbents did not respond 
in the traditional way, by lowering the prices of their current brands. Instead, they introduced entirely new 
brands (Sosh by Orange, RED by SFR and B&You by Bouygues), which were contract free, similar to 
Free’s offer. The incumbents in fact introduced these new brands slightly before the launch of Free, but 
once Free entered, they further reduced the prices of these new brands. 
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In ongoing work, Bourreau, Sun and Verboven (2016) investigate this case, using data on market shares 
and prices of all operators. Their preliminary evidence indicates that the entry of Free does not have a strong 
impact on the prices of the incumbents’ brands (consistent with our reduced form model). However, the 
prices of Free and the three “fighting brands” are much lower, and consumers thus mainly gain through this 
channel. 
END OF BOX. 
6. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS
We now discuss the results from several robustness checks and extensions. 
6.1. Price results 
We considered the robustness of our price analysis with respect to several assumptions. 
First, we considered how the results are affected when we vary the sample. To do so we use our IV 
specification with the HHI as the indicator of market structure. Column 1 of Table A2 in the Appendix 
simply reproduces the result from column 4 in Table 3 to ease comparisons. In column 2 we consider the 
whole sample available (2002-2014). This shows that the HHI still has a significant impact over the entire 
period, but the magnitude is smaller. To further explore this, we also broke down the period 2006-2014 into 
two subperiods: before and after 2010 (columns 3 and 4). This confirms that the impact of competition is 
smaller during 2006-2009 (HHI coefficient of 0.821) than during 2010-2014 (HHI coefficient of 4.812, 
though with a larger standard error and only significant at the 10% significance level). The higher impact 
of competition on prices during the later years is consistent with our earlier discussion of the French case, 
where the third entrant Bouygues was much less disruptive than the fourth entrant Free (see Box 1). One 
interpretation is that late entrants in mature markets need to be more aggressive to compete and obtain 
market shares than early entrants, who can still target new consumers without a subscription. Another 
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interpretation for the increased impact of competition on prices may be the more common practice of 
quadruple play, whereby operators bundle a broadband package (internet, fixed line and TV) with a mobile 
subscription). 
In the last two columns of Table A2, we restrict the sample to only European countries, either for the post-
2005 (column 5) or for the entire period (column 6). A comparison with columns 1 and 2 shows that the 
estimated coefficients are slightly smaller for Europe only, but remain positive and significant. 
Second, we considered the robustness of the results when we used fixed instead of varying baskets. The 
advantage of a fixed basket is that we use the same bundle of characteristics (combination of minutes, text, 
etc.) throughout the entire period, so that price comparisons over time are more transparent. The 
disadvantage is, however, that the basket may become less representative, especially in recent years when 
consumers may have shifted their behaviour towards more data consumption. Results are shown in Table 
A3 (for the whole sample) and in Table A4 (for Europe only) in the Appendix again using the IV 
specification with the HHI market structure indicator. In sum, the positive impact that market concentration 
has on prices holds both with fixed and with varying baskets. Accounting for varying baskets tends to result 
in somewhat larger price effects of increased concentration. This suggests that the price effects mainly 
manifest themselves in increased prices for data services rather than voice services. 
Third, to account for simple dynamics we also considered a specification with one-period lags for the 
market structure variables (with suitable lagged instruments in the IV specification with the HHI). We find 
that the coefficient of the lagged variable is statistically insignificant and also reduces the precision of the 
main estimate somewhat, so we prefer a simple specification with price adjustment within the same quarter. 
Fourth, we extended the analysis to allow prices to follow country-specific linear trends (as opposed to the 
parallel trend assumption we made with the set of common time fixed effects). The results are reported in 
Table A5 in Appendix. This shows that the results are very close to those reported earlier in Table 3.  Finally, 
we consider an extension of our main analysis in allowing the effects of increased concentration to differ 
31 
between different user profiles: low, medium and high. This robustness exercise is of particular policy 
interest as, after the recent Austrian merger, the concern was raised that the consumers most vulnerable to 
mergers would be low users.  Table 7 presents the results. The impact of the HHI is the smallest for 
consumers with a low usage, and it is largest for consumers with a high usage. This seems to indicate that 
mergers or entry especially affects the high users. However, when taking into account the rather large 
standard deviations due to the reduced sample sizes, these differences are not statistically significant, so 
that one can conclude that different user profiles are not affected differentially by changes in market 
concentration. Also note that the role of the control variables remains broadly similar to what we found in 
our main results in Table 3. In a similar spirit, we also run separate regressions for pre-paid and post-paid 
prices. In the first case, contract length and incentives to offer discounts through handset subsidies play no 
role. We find robust results for both contract types, but standard errors become considerably larger because 
of the reduced number of observations. 
6.2. Investment results 
We also considered the robustness of our investment analysis with respect to several assumptions. First, we 
replace absolute investment measure (CAPEXoct) by an investment measure relative to the total market size 
(CAPEXoct divided by total number of subscribers). The results, shown in Table A6, are totally comparable 
to those obtained earlier (Table 4). The impact of the market structure variables is actually slightly stronger 
and more significant 
Second, we considered how the results change for alternative samples. We conducted both the analysis of 
investment per operator (Table A7 in the Appendix), and the analysis of total industry investment (Table 
A8 in the Appendix). As before, we consider the whole sample available (column 2) and the restricted 
sample of only European countries either for the post-2005 (column 3) or for the entire period (column 4). 
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The estimated effects of the HHI on investment become less precisely estimated when we consider all years, 
or when we consider only European countries. The magnitude of the HHI effect is also lower when we 
consider the whole period. This indicates that concentration has especially raised investment in more recent 
years, which may reflect the strong investment needs with the roll-out of the 4G/LTE networks. 
Third, we considered heterogeneity across countries, in particular the role of being a mobile operator who 
is also active on fixed-line telecom markets. This may create synergies and some investment expenditures 
may benefit both the mobile and fixed-line consumers. We found that being also a fixed telecom operator 
raises investment (significance at the 10%) level, but does not imply a different HHI effect (no significant 
interaction term). 
As with the price analysis, we also considered a dynamic specification with one-period lags for the market 
structure variable. This is potentially more relevant for investment than for prices, as investment is more 
sluggish to adjust. However, we find that the effect of the lagged variable is insignificant and also implies 
an imprecise estimate for the effect of the market structure variable in the current period. This suggests that 
the data make it hard to identify the dynamics over time, even if such dynamics may be present. As a further 
robustness check, we omitted the current market structure variable and only included the one-period lagged 
variable. In this specification, the lagged effects are very close to the effects found in the model without 
lags. We conclude that the impact of increased concentration on investment may not be immediate, but the 
precise response length is difficult to identify from the existing data. 
We note that it would be interesting in further research to perform an analysis regarding the role of network-
sharing arrangements that are becoming popular in the industry. This could best be assessed through in-
depth case studies. In Box 2 we describe how network sharing agreements in the UK played a role in a 
recent merger assessment. 
BOX 2. Investment and network-sharing in the UK market 
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Mobile network sharing agreements play an important role in the mobile telecommunications sector. In the 
United Kingdom, there are two main network sharing agreements. First, MBNL is a 50/50 joint venture 
between Three and the recently merged British Telecom (BT)/Everything Everywhere (EE). MBNL 
provides a shared site portfolio which supports both shared (3G) and non-shared (2G/3G/4G) technologies 
used by Three and BT/EE. Second, the so called "Beacon" agreements between O2 and Vodafone comprise 
(i) a 50/50 joint venture between O2 and Vodafone, providing a shared site portfolio, and (ii) a contractual 
arrangement which provides shared 2G/3G/4G technologies used by O2 and Vodafone. 
In 2016, the European Commission blocked a proposed merger between Three and O2 in the UK. The 
Commission was not only concerned about potential price increases due to the loss of competition, but also 
feared that the future development of the shared UK mobile network infrastructure would be hampered. On 
the latter point, the Commission found that the merged entity would have less of an interest to engage in 
network sharing which in turn could weaken the competitive position of Vodafone and BT/EE. 
The Commission also assessed the claims by Hutchison that the integration of the networks of Three and 
O2 would result in a number of benefits. However, the Commission found that these claimed efficiencies 
were uncertain to materialise. Even if they did, they would only have started to materialise a few years after 
the merger and taken even longer to be realised in full. Therefore, the Commission could not conclude that 
the claimed efficiencies would be able to outweigh the harm to consumers, which would have materialised 
immediately after the merger as a result of the loss in competition in the market. 
END OF BOX. 
6.3. Impact of market structure on other performance measures 
As an addition to the price and investment analysis, we also considered other performance measures 
available from the same data source at the level of the operators. For the analysis of performance per 
operator we considered the following performance measures: the impact on profits (EBITDA), on 
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percentage profit margins (EBITDA margin) and on average price per user (ARPU). For the analysis of 
industry performance we considered total industry profits and total market penetration (subscribers as a 
percentage of total population). We also checked how the results for industry investment and industry 
profits change when we do not adjust the measure by total market size. 
Table 8 shows the results for the performance per operator. We consider the period post 2005. Results can 
be summarized as follows: 
• Profits (EBITDA) per operator (column 2): Both the order of entry and the time since entry have a 
significant and positive impact on profits. Furthermore, an increase in the HHI by 10 percentage points 
significantly raises profits per operator by 48.1% (column 2), whereas investment per operator increases by 
24.1% (column 1), and vice versa for a decrease in the HHI by 10 percentage points. 
• EBITDA profit margin (column 3): The order of entry matters, with the first entrant obtaining the 
highest profit margin, followed by the second and third entrant. An increase in concentration by 10 
percentage points raises the profit margin by 5.37 percentage points. This increase in profit margin is 
consistent with our findings in the price analysis, but it can also be in part due to efficiencies from increased 
investment. 
• Average revenue per user (ARPU; column 4): No operator-specific variables have a significant 
impact on this performance measure. Furthermore, the HHI does not have a significant impact either. 
We should note that the EBITDA margin can simply be rewritten as (Average revenues – Average 
costs)/Average revenues = 1 – ACPU/ARPU, where ACPU denotes the average cost per user. Since we 
find that ARPU does not change with concentration, while EBITDA increases, this suggests that 
concentration should decrease the average cost per user, which can be interpreted as an efficiency defence 
of mergers. 
Table 9 shows the results for industry performance at the country level. Again, we consider the period post 
2005. Results can be summarized as follows: 
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• Industry investment (columns 1 and 2): When we adjust the missing observations on investment 
by the market share, the estimated impact of a 10% increase in the HHI on industry investment is estimated 
to be 11.96% but insignificant, compared to 30.88% (significant at the 10% level) when we do not adjust. 
• Industry profits (columns 3 and 4): Similarly, an increase in the HHI does not have a significant 
impact on the adjusted measure of industry profits, where it has a significant positive impact on the 
unadjusted measure. 
• Market penetration (column 5): An increase in the HHI does not have a significant effect on the 
number of mobile users, possibly reflecting the finding that the mobile industry is quite mature with 
inelastic demand at the industry level. 
7. DISCUSSION AND CAVEATS
This study is driven by data availability and has some limitations that we wish to discuss in this section. 
We start with our metrics for prices. We used the Teligen basket methodology, which identifies the cheapest 
tariff for different usage profiles. An advantage of this approach is that it provides a clear and undisputed 
measure for what a certain customer would pay. That is, Teligen obtains a measure for the customer bill, 
with many details that are practically relevant and accounted for (e.g., distribution of calls, SMS, data 
downloads, and so forth). This raises the question, however, of how representative the hypothetical bill 
identified by Teligen is compared to the actual bill paid by customers. Customers in different countries may 
have different mobile usage attitudes: to the extent that these are time invariant, or that they change 
proportionally over time in the various countries, our (country-operator-usage, as well as time) fixed effects 
would capture such differences, and therefore we included them in our analysis. If instead there are 
variations that are time and country specific, then our results could be biased – though the direction of bias 
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is not clear a priori. We also note that we used both fixed baskets, as well as time-varying baskets, and we 
did not find qualitative differences, which should be reassuring for the robustness of our findings. 
An alternative to the basket approach would be to look at aggregated revenues, such as ARPU. But we 
would argue that these measures, which are sometimes used in other studies, are not very meaningful. This 
is for two reasons. First, by definition, ARPU relates to total revenues per subscriber. These revenues also 
include revenues for incoming calls, which are not paid by a given subscriber but by calling subscribers 
from other networks. Hence this is not related to the customer bill, but it is closer to a measure of 
profitability. Second, total revenues per subscriber depend also on the usage made by the subscriber for a 
given price, so ARPU may be large also because the allowance of a given price is large. In other words, 
changes in ARPU may reflect changes in the composition of consumption rather than real price changes. It 
is of no surprise that, when analysing ARPU directly, we found that it has no clear relationship with market 
structure. We therefore conclude that ARPU, which may be monitored perhaps to provide a view on 
profitability, is not an interesting variable to study when looking at the impact on subscriber prices. In itself, 
this is also an interesting finding of our analysis. 
One could make a step further by constructing “average” prices, that is, ARPU (excluding termination 
revenues) adjusted for some measure of quantity and quality. Some imperfect measures of usage exist, but 
they are always related to voice services, while almost nothing is available over time and across countries 
for data. Hence it is very difficult to revert to average pricing measures in an exercise, like ours, involving 
a large panel with many operators and several years of observations, where data comparability is a strong 
driver of the empirical strategy. The basket approach ultimately is the only one that allows consistent 
comparisons. An alternative, of course, is to renounce a panel approach and to concentrate on country-
specific studies with all the details that could be gathered at the country level, but not internationally. 
Another limitation of the basket approach is that, given the data intensive exercise to find the cheapest price 
in every quarter among the universe of available offers, Teligen supplies information only for the two 
largest operators in every country/period. The implication of this, given that it is rare that the largest 
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operators are involved in a merger, is that we may underestimate the impact of a merger. The largest 
operators, to the extent that they are outsiders to a merger, will have an indirect (strategic) effect to increase 
prices when competing in strategic complements. This effect is typically smaller than the (direct) effect of 
merging operators who internalise their pricing choices. Keeping this remark in mind, we also point to our 
analysis on EBITDA margins, which comes from a different dataset (BoAML): while this analysis is only 
indirectly related to prices, it does however look at all operators, and produces findings that are in line with 
the price results. 
Both our price and our investment analysis produce average results across time and countries. It would be 
interesting to try to distinguish in more accurate ways between the impact that entry or exit might have 
when related to smaller or to larger firms, or to “pure” mobile operators as opposed to those integrated with 
fixed line operations. Similarly, one could collect more data on operator characteristics, such as public 
ownership or multi-market presence. 
Also, as discussed earlier, our analysis lacks data on mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) because 
these are not available in any consistent way over time and across countries. We used the available data as 
collected in the BoAML dataset, but this does not keep track of MVNO information in a systematic way. 
We do not expect that MVNO entry is systematically correlated with the merger events, conditional on our 
time and country fixed effects. Hence, this would not affect our main results on the impact of mergers on 
prices. Furthermore, while MVNOs might be offering the best available contracts for low-usage consumers 
after they enter, they have relatively small market shares, and they may offer lower service quality. We 
therefore think that our approach, to take a fixed basket of the two largest MNOs, is justifiable. 
Nevertheless, in future research it would be interesting to study the separate impact of MVNOs, which may 
be most relevant in the low usage segment. The best advice for an analysis of MVNOs is probably to 
conduct a narrower but deeper analysis at the country level. We also note that MVNOs are also proposed 
as possible remedies to recent mergers, and that mergers are themselves endogenous and not randomly 
allocated. A similar remark applies also to other remedies, such as network sharing. The best we could do 
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in our data was to distinguish between net entry (likely to be related to licensing) and net exit (likely to be 
related to mergers). We pointed above to the asymmetric effects on prices and investments due to entry/exit, 
which is a transparent and parsimonious way to describe the differences in the mechanisms and outcomes. 
Our analysis did not consider the role of financial constraints. Financial constraints may influence market 
structure, and they may also directly influence the decision to make investments. While we have financial 
indicators such as EBITDA in our dataset, we have treated them as endogenous. As an alternative, we 
considered the role of short-term interest rates. This variable does not enter significantly in our model, and 
does not affect our main results. Future research should consider the role of operator-specific financial 
constraints more thoroughly, with suitable instruments that explain the evolution of these constraints. 
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analysed the impact of market structure on prices and investments in the mobile 
telecommunications industry. We have conducted an empirical study using a panel of 33 OECD countries 
over the period 2002-2014. We have collected detailed information at the level of individual mobile 
network operators, assembling what is, to our knowledge, the largest dataset employed to-date for works 
of this kind. 
We find that, during the analysed period, when mobile markets became more concentrated, prices increased 
to end users with respect to the case in which no concentration happened (absolute prices actually decreased 
in all cases during the analysed period). At the same time, capital expenditures increased. These results are 
robust to various perturbations and remain significant even when we control for unobserved heterogeneity 
using panel data techniques and when we address market structure endogeneity using different instrumental 
variables. At the country level, we found an insignificant effect of market structure on total industry 
investments, which is possibly influenced by the smaller sample size and reduced variability (across country 
instead of across country and operator variation). Nevertheless, as we have already pointed out, theoretical 
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work has shown that an increase in concentration would lead to a decrease in total industry investment in 
the absence of efficiencies. Hence, our finding that concentration has no effect on industry investment 
suggests that efficiencies from coordinating investment among fewer firms are present. An obvious 
possibility is that there are fixed cost savings, because fewer firms avoid duplicating the same fixed costs. 
Such savings can be welfare improving, but do not benefit consumers. A second possibility is that there are 
economies of scope or spill-overs that generate marginal cost savings or quality improvements to the benefit 
of consumers. 
The effects refer to average effects on past changes in market structure, which are significant but also with 
margin of error, and the past results do not necessarily apply to future mergers. Keeping this caveat in mind, 
our results are significant not only statistically but also economically. A hypothetical average 4-to-3 
symmetric merger in our data would have increased the bill of end users by 16.3%, while at the same time 
capital expenditure would have gone up by 19.3% at the operator level, always in comparison with what 
would happen in the case of no merger. More realistic asymmetric 4-to-3 mergers (between smaller firms 
in European countries) are predicted to have increased the bill by about 4-7%, while increasing capital 
expenditure per operator by between 7.5-14%. 
To our knowledge, it is the first time that the dual impact of market structure on prices and investments has 
been assessed and found to be very relevant in mobile communications, both from an economic and from 
a statistical point of view. Our findings are therefore of utmost importance for competition authorities, who 
face a trade-off when confronted with an average merger similar to one captured in our sample. Ceteris 
paribus, a merger will have static price effects to the detriment of consumers, but also dynamic benefits for 
consumers to the extent that investments enhance their demand for services. 
In European merger control, merging parties face tough hurdles when putting forward an efficiency defence 
and, as such, it remains questionable whether efficiencies will ever play an important role in decisions under 
the EC Merger Regulation in any but the most exceptional cases. However, this is not to say that advisers 
should abandon enquiries about the rationale for mergers or any anticipated efficiency gains. In practice, 
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though, the main pay-off from an understanding of the expected efficiencies arising from a horizontal 
merger is likely to be the insights this gives about the nature of competitive rivalry in an industry, which in 
turn will assist in gathering evidence on market dynamics and likely supply-side responses. Such evidence 
should not be an after-thought. It deserves a central role in a unilateral effects assessment that justifies a 
departure from the constraints imposed by simple theoretical static models. 
An open question that our study raises, but cannot answer due to data limitations, is an assessment of the 
impact of investments on consumer surplus. Capital expenditures, our measure for investments, refer to all 
the money spent to acquire or upgrade physical assets. This could be related to cell sites, which improve 
coverage and/or speed, both of which would be enjoyed by consumers. Understanding where the extra 
investment money goes when a market gets more concentrated is an inescapable question to properly assess 
the consequences of mergers in mobile telecommunications markets. The missing link, which we hope will 
be further researched by operators, competition authorities and scholars alike, is the understanding of the 
consumer benefits that arise as a consequence of operators’ investments. 
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9. Appendix
In this Appendix we provide the first-stage results and we discuss the results of several robustness checks 
of our results that we conducted. 
Table A1 shows the first stage regression results of our various instrumental variables regressions for prices, 
operator’s investment and industry investment (corresponding to specifications (3) and (4) of, respectively, 
Table 3, 4 and 5 in the text. 
The next tables show the results of several robustness checks. First, we consider how the price results are 
affected when we increase the sample to the entire period available, or when we restrict the sample to only 
European countries, which constitute a more homogeneous group of countries. For simplicity, we focus 
only on the results based on the HHI measure of concentration, using the first instrument set that, based on 
the previous results, is somewhat more conservative. Table A2 presents the results. Compared with the 
sample of all countries post-2005 (column 1) the estimated effect of the HHI drops to 1.399 (column 2), 
when we consider the full sample (since 2002). Furthermore, the estimated effect of the HHI is also lower 
for the sample of European countries (it decreases to 1.028 in column 3 in the sample post-2005 and to 
0.827 in the full sample in column 4). The estimated effect remains significant at the 10% level or higher. 
Second, we considered how the results change when we used fixed baskets instead of varying baskets over 
the period. Table A3 shows the results of this exercise. The first two columns repeat our previous results 
where we allow for varying baskets (for the HHI measure of competition with the first instrument set), both 
for the sample post-2005 and for the full sample. The next two columns show the results when we use the 
2002 basket throughout the entire period, again both for the sample post-2005 and for the full sample. The 
advantage of a fixed basket is that we use the same price proxy throughout the entire period. The 
disadvantage is, however, that the basket may become less representative, especially in recent years when 
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consumers may have shifted their behaviour towards more data consumption. The estimated impact of the 
HHI becomes lower in this model. For the sample post-2005, an increase in the HHI by 10% is now 
estimated to increase prices by a statistically significant 12.93% (column 3), compared to the 20.37% 
estimate we obtained before using the varying baskets price measure. A similar finding holds when we use 
the whole sample since 2002, where the estimated effect of the 10% increase in the HHI is now 10.48% 
(column 4) compared to 13.99% under the varying basket measure (column 2). Finally, the last column 
reports the results when we use the 2006 basket (for the period post-2005). This again shows a lower 
estimate of the HHI: a 10% increase in the HHI raises prices by 16.28% (column 5) compared with 20.37% 
under the varying basket measure (column 1). 
As a further robustness analysis, we repeated this analysis for the sample of European countries only. This 
shows a similar picture, as summarized in Table A4: the estimated price effects from increased 
concentration tend to become smaller if we used fixed baskets for 2002 and 2006, but they remain 
statistically significant. 
Finally, in Table A5 we re-estimate the same specifications as in Table 3, but now we also allow for country-
specific linear trends. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those reported in Table 3. 
We now turn to the robustness of our investment analysis. First, we replicate the results in Table 4 by 
replacing the absolute investment measure (CAPEXoct) by an investment measure relative to the total 
market size (CAPEXoct divided by total number of subscribers). The results, shown in Table A6, are 
qualitatively totally comparable to those obtained earlier (Table 4), while the impact of the market structure 
variables is actually slightly stronger and more significant. 
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Second, we considered how the results change for alternative samples: longer period, restriction to 
European countries. As before, we only present the robustness analysis for the results of our specification 
with the HHI measure of competition (first instrument set). 
Table A7 shows the results for the analysis of investment per operator. In column 1, for ease of comparison, 
we report the earlier obtained results for the main sample (period post 2005, all countries, shown in Table 
5, column 4). According to Table A7, the estimated effect of the HHI on investment per operator becomes 
lower when we consider all years, or when we consider only European countries. However, using the entire 
sample is less appropriate since the investment information was available for fewer countries in the earlier 
periods. 
Table A8 shows the results for the analysis of total industry investment, that is, the results from estimating 
the investment equation (3) at the country level. The base result in column 1 (period post 2005, all countries) 
shows a positive but not significant impact of HHI on investments at the country level. The estimated effect 
of the HHI on total industry investment also becomes lower when we consider all years or only European 
countries, but as before the effect is imprecisely estimated and insignificant. 
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FIGURE 1: PRICE EVOLUTION OF MOBILE TARIFFS, 2006Q1-2014Q1 (2006Q1=100)
Notes: The figure presents information on the normalised (at the beginning of 2006) PPP-adjusted demeaned average prices (total bill paid) across countries for all tariffs (overall) and
for each consumer profile separately (low, medium, high).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter across 33 countries.
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FIGURE 2: EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT (CAPEX), PROFITS (EBITDA), PROFIT MARGINS (EBITDA MARGIN) AND 
REVENUES (ARPU), 2006Q1-2014Q1 (2006Q1=100)
Notes: The figure presents information on the normalised (at the beginning of the period) PPP-adjusted demeaned average CAPEX, EBITDA, EBITDA margin and ARPU across
countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on accounting information from the Global Wireless Matrix of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BoAML) dataset.
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Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Mobile tariff price (Puoct) 7789 559.7 2760.7 5329 564.7 3328.2
Mobile tariff price (low user profile) 2598 186.780 78.997 1778 178.8 84.4
Mobile tariff price (medium user profile) 2596 504.701 1906.1 1776 497.6 2301.7
Mobile tariff price (high user profile) 2595 987.977 4349.1 1775 1018.4 5253.6
Number of competitors (Nct) 7378 3.556 0.925 5002 3.558 0.830
Four competitors dummy 7789 0.293 0.455 5329 0.343 0.475
Five+ competitors dummy 7789 0.113 0.317 5329 0.078 0.268
Cumulative entry 7378 0.382 0.536 5002 0.419 0.548
Cumulative exit 7378 0.298 0.607 5002 0.383 0.686
HHI 7330 0.371 0.078 5002 0.359 0.065
Pre-paid dummy 7789 0.349 0.477 5329 0.360 0.480
GDP per capita 7510 37803.0 20813.9 5134 41181.8 21964.2
Mobile Termination Rate 6679 0.105 0.068 4930 0.087 0.058
MTR_Diffct 6760 0.502 2.595 4930 0.301 1.436
CAPEXoct 2573 159.6 257.6 2345 164.9 267.0
EBITDAoct 3004 376.5 545.1 2715 386.1 560.2
EBITDA marginoct 4666 0.321 0.237 2704 0.349 0.221
ARPUoct 4994 35.205 62.213 2875 32.793 81.086
Number of competitors (Nct) 5049 3.805 1.013 2903 3.725 0.866
Four competitors dummy 5049 0.361 0.480 2903 0.429 0.495
Five+ competitors dummy 5049 0.188 0.391 2903 0.118 0.323
Cumulative entry 5049 0.317 0.481 2903 0.372 0.483
Cumulative exit 5049 0.297 0.597 2903 0.454 0.711
HHI 5049 0.361 0.077 2903 0.349 0.069
GDP per capita 4793 33782.4 16886.1 2761 39335.5 17791.8
Mobile Termination Rate 3922 0.123 0.089 2495 0.084 0.064
MTR_Diffct 3957 0.444 2.325 2495 0.317 1.443
Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset (2006-2014)
TABLE 1 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Teligen dataset (2006-2014)Teligen dataset (2002-2014)
Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset (2002-2014)
Notes: The above table provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Tables 3-9 based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter, the BoAML dataset and the
matched MTRs. The unit of observation in the Teligen dataset is at the country-operator-usage profile level, whereasint the BoAML dataset it is at the country-operator level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen, Cullen and BoAML matched datasets.
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Period 2002Q2 2006Q1 2010Q1 2014Q1
Number of 
countries
Number of 
countries
Number of 
countries
Number of 
countries
2 competitors 3 3
3 competitors 14 14 16 18
4 competitors 7 7 10 13
5 competitors 3 3 1 1
6 competitors 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 28 28 28 33
TABLE 2 - COUNTRIES AND COMPETITORS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FD FD FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.0855***
(0.0290)
Four competitors -0.159***
(0.0425)
Five+ competitors -0.0785
(0.0629)
Cumulative entry -0.0934*
(0.0488)
Cumulative exit 0.0432*
(0.0248)
HHI 2.037*** 2.529**
(0.637) (1.148)
Pre-paidjct 0.0338 0.0360 0.0344 0.0337 0.0337
(0.0543) (0.0537) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0543)
Log GDP per capita -0.0153 -0.0845 -0.0199 -0.0142 -0.0110
(0.213) (0.180) (0.213) (0.216) (0.216)
ln(MTR)oct 0.192*** 0.168*** 0.194*** 0.201*** 0.201***
(0.0693) (0.0553) (0.0689) (0.0685) (0.0689)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00449** -0.00403*** -0.00451** -0.00484*** -0.00486***
(0.00182) (0.00139) (0.00181) (0.00179) (0.00179)
Constant -0.066 -0.052 -0.056** -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.050) (0.077) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.302
First stage F-test 33.25 51.49
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 4,682 4,550 4,550 4,550
R2 0.788 0.787 0.788 0.788 0.787
Clusters 192 192 192 192 192
TABLE 3 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.107**
(0.0416)
Four competitors -0.183***
(0.0612)
Five+ competitors -0.253**
(0.120)
Cumulative entry -0.110
(0.0695)
Cumulative exit 0.0560
(0.0541)
HHI 2.410** 2.786**
(1.164) (1.204)
Time since entryoct 0.0199 0.0204 0.0197 0.0120 0.0124
(0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0223) (0.0203) (0.0203)
First entrant 0.676* 0.661* 0.681* 0.584* 0.577*
(0.349) (0.350) (0.351) (0.301) (0.300)
Second entrant 0.535* 0.521* 0.539* 0.344 0.339
(0.300) (0.301) (0.301) (0.259) (0.259)
Third entrant 0.496* 0.484* 0.501* 0.353 0.348
(0.268) (0.270) (0.268) (0.226) (0.225)
Log GDP per capita 0.673** 0.631** 0.728*** 0.888*** 0.894***
(0.264) (0.270) (0.261) (0.275) (0.279)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.476
First stage F-test 252.24 65.38
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,073 2,073
R2 0.173 0.174 0.173 0.139 0.137
Clusters 78 78 78 75 75
TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S INVESTMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPEX of mobile operator o in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors
clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
57
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.0358
(0.0439)
Four competitors -0.0594
(0.0672)
Five+ competitors -0.0877
(0.0872)
Cumulative entry -0.0558
(0.0950)
Cumulative exit 0.0179
(0.0525)
HHI 1.196 1.457
(1.592) (1.240)
Log GDP per capita 0.559* 0.546 0.573* 0.625* 0.630*
(0.335) (0.335) (0.321) (0.377) (0.381)
Log Population -0.103 -0.107 -0.104 -0.124 -0.128*
(0.0755) (0.0792) (0.0762) (0.0772) (0.0768)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.542 0.408
First stage F-test 70.81 11.82
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 720 720 720 618 618
R2 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.022 0.018
Clusters 27 27 27 24 24
TABLE 5 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON INDUSTRY INVESTMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the market share adjusted CAPEX in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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Country
Time of merger
Type of merger
Buyer
     Market share buyer
Seller
     Market share seller
HHI before
HHI after
Change in HHI
Predicted change in price
     90% confidence interval 1.0% 12.2% 0.6% 6.8% 1.1% 12.7%
Predicted change in investment
     90% confidence interval 1.2% 25.5% 0.7% 14.3% 1.2% 26.5%
T-Mobile
Orange
21%
20%19%
11%
Orange Orange
6.6% 3.7% 6.9%
13.3% 7.5% 13.9%
5 to 4
0.291
0.355
0.064
0.347
0.383
0.036
0.221
0.288
0.067
4 to 3 4 to 3
T-Mobile
15%
12%
3 (Hutchison)
TABLE 6 - PREDICTED MERGER EFFECTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
Austria Netherlands UK
2013Q1 2007Q4 2010Q2
Notes: Counterfactual calculations based on three recent actual mergers in Europe.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the estimated coefficients from Table A2, column 5 and from Table A7, column 3.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket
Usage profile Low Medium High Pre-paid Post-paid
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
HHI 1.751* 2.142* 2.246* 1.336 1.650***
(0.904) (1.172) (1.182) (1.026) (0.636)
Pre-paidjct -0.00264 0.0466 0.119
(0.0281) (0.0927) (0.157)
Log GDP per capita 0.0614 -0.0933 -0.0455 1.043** -0.555**
(0.230) (0.263) (0.456) (0.464) (0.220)
ln(MTR)oct 0.0720 0.233* 0.340*** 0.542*** -0.0507
(0.105) (0.119) (0.112) (0.155) (0.126)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.000615 -0.00736** -0.00785*** -0.00942*** 0.000190
(0.00297) (0.00312) (0.00295) (0.00365) (0.00290)
Constant -0.0193 -0.113*** -0.225*** -0.103** -0.102***
(0.0377) (0.0304) (0.0515) (0.0422) (0.0301)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.479 0.495
First stage F-test 10.35 10.96 11.01 18919 25.01
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,520 1,516 1,514 1,542 3,008
R2 0.916 0.791 0.741 0.749 0.810
Clusters 64 64 64 156 180
TABLE 7 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - DIFFERENT USAGE AND CONTRACT TYPES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXoct lnEBITDAoct EBITDA Marginoct lnARPUoct
Countries All All All All
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
HHI 2.410** 4.809*** 0.537** 0.115
(1.164) (1.531) (0.267) (0.627)
Time since entryoct 0.0120 0.0481* 0.00285 0.0124
(0.0203) (0.0286) (0.00372) (0.00896)
First entrant 0.584* 2.017*** 0.224*** -0.107
(0.301) (0.437) (0.0471) (0.0875)
Second entrant 0.344 1.753*** 0.198*** 0.0203
(0.259) (0.385) (0.0398) (0.0711)
Third entrant 0.353 1.524*** 0.162*** -0.0805
(0.226) (0.334) (0.0348) (0.0546)
Log GDP per capita 0.888*** 0.789** 0.0423 0.293***
(0.275) (0.361) (0.0513) (0.100)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.613 0.614 0.612
First stage F-test 252.24 309.02 307.69 311.34
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,073 2,231 2,221 2,338
R2 0.139 0.596 0.371 0.051
Clusters 75 80 79 81
TABLE 8 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S PERFORMANCE - 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Notes: The dependent variable varies by column as indicated in row 3. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered
at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXct - adjusted lnCAPEXct - unadjusted lnEBITDAct - adjusted lnEBITDAct - unadjusted lnSubscribersct
Countries All All All All All
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
HHI 1.196 3.088* 0.537 2.519*** 0.441
(1.592) (1.859) (0.787) (0.680) (0.485)
Log GDP per capita 0.625* 0.852** 0.267 0.494* 0.280
(0.377) (0.408) (0.307) (0.282) (0.197)
Log Population -0.124 -0.0904 -0.0715* -0.0395 -0.0207
(0.0772) (0.0878) (0.0418) (0.0360) (0.0220)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.559 0.559
First stage F-test 70.81 70.81 70.81 72.14 72.14
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 618 618 618 624 624
R2 0.022 0.023 0.010 0.042 0.065
Clusters 24 24 24 24 24
TABLE 9 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE - ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Notes: The dependent variable varies by column as indicated in row 3. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis below
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct
Teligen basket varying basket varying basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Diff MTR indexct (x 103) -0.323*** -0.463*** -1.524*** -1.649*** -1.382*** -1.405***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.269) (0.300) (0.726) (0.763)
Three competitors -0.069*** -0.094*** -0.091***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Four competitors -0.094*** -0.133*** -0.126***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Five competitors -0.118*** -0.199*** -0.180***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.018)
Six competitors -0.116*** -0.137*** -0.130***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.008)
Seven competitors -0.117***
(0.013)
Cumulative entry -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.055***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013)
Cumulative exit 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.302 0.586 0.476 0.542 0.408
First stage F-test 33.25 51.49 252.24 65.38 70.81 11.82
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 4,550 2,073 2,073 618 618
TABLE A1 - FIRST STAGE RESULTS
Notes: The dependent variable varies by column as indicated in row 3. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage
(columns 1-2) or at country-operator (columns 3-4) or country level (columns 5-6) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen, Cullen and BoAML matched datasets.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket
Countries All All All All Europe only Europe only
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2009 2010-2016 2006-2014 2002-2014
HHI 2.037*** 1.399*** 0.821** 4.812* 1.028* 0.827**
(0.637) (0.465) (0.355) (2.827) (0.528) (0.375)
Pre-paidoct 0.0337 0.0287 -0.0685*** 0.100 -0.0526** -0.0446**
(0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0251) (0.0871) (0.0212) (0.0185)
Log GDP per capita -0.0142 -0.0227 -0.430** 0.310 0.184 0.144
(0.216) (0.193) (0.208) (0.346) (0.183) (0.164)
ln(MTR)oct 0.201*** 0.177*** 0.215*** 0.117 0.271*** 0.203***
(0.0685) (0.0524) (0.0749) (0.147) (0.0672) (0.0544)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00484*** -0.00411*** -0.00848*** -0.00283 -0.00702*** -0.00527***
(0.00179) (0.00145) (0.00190) (0.00355) (0.00180) (0.00151)
Constant -0.094*** -0.112*** -0.0794*** -0.108*** -0.133*** -0.125***
(0.022) (0.0238) (0.0156) (0.0291) (0.0274) (0.0271)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct,
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.194 0.587 0.454 0.585 0.2306
First stage F-test 33.25 42.03 26.66 7190 15927.21 951.12
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 6,044 2,469 2,081 3,632 4,886
R2 0.788 0.782 0.075 0.806 0.895 0.888
Clusters 192 201 156 189 150 156
TABLE A2 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics.
Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket 2002 basket 2002 basket 2006 basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014
HHI 2.037*** 1.399*** 1.293*** 1.048*** 1.628***
(0.637) (0.465) (0.375) (0.351) (0.450)
Pre-paidoct 0.0337 0.0287 -0.0234 -0.0196 -0.00595
(0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0189)
Log GDP per capita -0.0142 -0.0227 -0.309*** -0.281*** -0.241**
(0.216) (0.193) (0.101) (0.0920) (0.115)
ln(MTR)oct 0.201*** 0.177*** 0.235*** 0.197*** 0.0888**
(0.0685) (0.0524) (0.0503) (0.0430) (0.0355)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00484*** -0.00411*** -0.00565*** -0.00459*** -0.00329**
(0.00179) (0.00145) (0.00124) (0.00112) (0.00133)
Constant -0.094*** -0.112*** -0.0357** -0.0315** -0.0257**
(0.022) (0.0238) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0124)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.194 0.453 0.194 0.455
First stage F-test 33.25 42.03 33.44 41.94 58.58
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 6,044 4,533 6,027 4,590
R2 0.788 0.782 0.094 0.088 0.021
Clusters 192 201 192 201 192
TABLE A3 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - VARYING vs. FIXED BASKETS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket 2002 basket 2002 basket 2006 basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014
HHI 1.028* 0.827** 0.654** 0.500* 1.009***
(0.528) (0.375) (0.281) (0.299) (0.318)
Pre-paidjct -0.0526** -0.0446** -0.0317* -0.0264* -0.00647
(0.0212) (0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0200)
Log GDP per capita 0.184 0.144 0.0373 0.0133 0.0557
(0.183) (0.164) (0.101) (0.0931) (0.105)
ln(MTR)oct 0.271*** 0.203*** 0.244*** 0.190*** 0.126***
(0.0672) (0.0544) (0.0522) (0.0478) (0.0317)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00702*** -0.00527*** -0.00600*** -0.00458*** -0.00420***
(0.00180) (0.00151) (0.00134) (0.00127) (0.00125)
Constant -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.0217 -0.0150 -0.0145
(0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0111)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.585 0.231 0.587 0.231 0.594
First stage F-test 15927.21 951.12 15436.07 1018.71 25310.55
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 3,632 4,886 3,591 4,845 3,654
R2 0.895 0.888 0.093 0.086 0.025
Clusters 150 156 150 156 150
TABLE A4 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - VARYING vs. FIXED BASKETS, EUROPE ONLY
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FD FD FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.0807***
(0.0290)
Four competitors -0.138***
(0.0399)
Five+ competitors -0.0557
(0.0607)
Cumulative entry -0.0960**
(0.0464)
Cumulative exit 0.0261
(0.0268)
HHI 2.531*** 2.465**
(0.650) (1.133)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage F-test 26.53 33.74
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 4,682 4,550 4,550 4,550
R2 0.799 0.798 0.799 0.798 0.798
Clusters 192 192 192 192 192
TABLE A5 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRENDS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic
tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct)
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.131***
(0.0413)
Four competitors -0.205***
(0.0600)
Five+ competitors -0.338***
(0.118)
Cumulative entry -0.131*
(0.0676)
Cumulative exit 0.0832
(0.0519)
HHI 2.704** 3.370***
(1.201) (1.207)
Time since entryoct 0.0210 0.0217 0.0210 0.0143 0.0150
(0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0199) (0.0199)
First entrant 0.663* 0.647* 0.666* 0.559* 0.546*
(0.347) (0.348) (0.349) (0.296) (0.294)
Second entrant 0.526* 0.512* 0.529* 0.327 0.317
(0.299) (0.300) (0.299) (0.256) (0.255)
Third entrant 0.487* 0.474* 0.491* 0.334 0.326
(0.267) (0.269) (0.267) (0.224) (0.222)
Log GDP per capita 0.371 0.337 0.432* 0.604** 0.615**
(0.233) (0.236) (0.227) (0.245) (0.253)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.476
First stage F-test 252.24 65.38
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,073 2,073
R2 0.171 0.172 0.170 0.132 0.129
Clusters 78 78 78 75 75
TABLE A6 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S INVESTMENT RELATIVE TO MARKET SIZE
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPEX of mobile operator o in county c in quarter t relative to the total market size (total number of subscribers). P-values for
diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct
Countries All All Europe only Europe only
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014
HHI 2.410** 1.400* 2.075* 1.119
(1.164) (0.796) (1.149) (0.786)
Time since entryoct 0.0120 0.0123 -0.00232 0.00813
(0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0365) (0.0362)
First entrant 0.584* 0.568* 0.725 0.600
(0.301) (0.290) (0.501) (0.476)
Second entrant 0.344 0.307 0.554 0.405
(0.259) (0.252) (0.429) (0.414)
Third entrant 0.353 0.303 0.416 0.300
(0.226) (0.218) (0.363) (0.343)
Log GDP per capita 0.888*** 0.941*** 1.830*** 1.688***
(0.275) (0.260) (0.356) (0.348)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.640 0.614 0.672
First stage F-test 252.24 168.70 534.62 500.43
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,073 2,269 1,612 1,789
R2 0.139 0.143 0.161 0.162
Clusters 75 75 59 59
TABLE A7 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S INVESTMENT - 
ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPEX of mobile operator o in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets
and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct
Countries All All Europe only Europe only
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014
HHI 1.196 0.354 -1.362 -1.029*
(1.592) (0.956) (1.425) (0.554)
Log GDP per capita 0.625* 0.726** 1.341*** 1.277***
(0.377) (0.321) (0.289) (0.321)
Log Population -0.124 -0.121* -0.123 -0.126
(0.0772) (0.0715) (0.0926) (0.0911)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.542 0.621 0.523 0.652
First stage F-test 70.81 38.38 330.54 125.00
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 618 671 467 514
R2 0.022 0.032 0.140 0.130
Clusters 24 24 18 18
TABLE A8 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON INDUSTRY INVESTMENT - 
ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the market share adjusted CAPEX in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets
and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
70
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1485 Andrew E. Clark 
Sarah Flèche 
Richard Layard 
Nattavudh Powdthavee 
George Ward 
The Key Determinants of Happiness and 
Misery 
1484 Matthew Skellern The Hospital as a Multi-Product Firm: The 
Effect of Hospital Competition on Value-
Added Indicators of Clinical Quality 
1483 Davide Cantoni 
Jeremiah Dittmar 
Noam Yuchtman 
Reallocation and Secularization: The 
Economic Consequences of the Protestant 
Reformation 
1482 David Autor 
David Dorn 
Lawrence F. Katz 
Christina Patterson 
John Van Reenen 
The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of 
Superstar Firms 
1481 Irene Sanchez Arjona 
Ester Faia 
Gianmarco Ottaviano 
International Expansion and Riskiness of 
Banks 
1480 Sascha O. Becker 
Thiemo Fetzer 
Dennis Novy 
Who voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive 
District-Level Analysis 
1479 Philippe Aghion 
Nicholas Bloom 
Brian Lucking 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
Turbulence, Firm Decentralization and 
Growth in Bad Times 
1478 Swati Dhingra 
Hanwei Huang 
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
João Paulo Pessoa 
Thomas Sampson 
John Van Reenen 
The Costs and Benefits of Leaving the EU: 
Trade Effects 
1477 Marco Bertoni 
Stephen Gibbons 
Olmo Silva 
What’s in a name? Expectations, heuristics 
and choice during a period of radical school 
reform 
1476 David Autor 
David Dorn 
Lawrence F. Katz 
Christina Patterson 
John Van Reenen 
Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share 
1475 Ruben Durante 
Paolo Pinotti 
Andrea Tesei 
 
The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV 
1474 Jan-Emmanuel De Neve 
George Ward 
 
Happiness at Work 
1473 Diego Battiston 
Jordi Blanes i Vidal 
Tom Kirchmaier 
 
Is Distance Dead? Face-to-Face 
Communication and Productivity in Teams 
1472 Sarah Flèche Teacher Quality, Test Scores and Non-
Cognitive Skills: Evidence from Primary 
School Teachers in the UK 
1471 Ester Faia 
Gianmarco Ottaviano 
 
Global Banking: Risk Taking and 
Competition 
1470 Nicholas Bloom 
Erik Brynjolfsson 
Lucia Foster 
Ron Jarmin 
Megha Patnaik 
Itay Saporta-Eksten 
John Van Reenen 
 
What Drives Differences in Management? 
1469 Kalina Manova 
Zhihong Yu 
 
Multi-Product Firms and Product Quality 
1468 Jo Blanden 
Kirstine Hansen 
Sandra McNally 
 
Quality in Early Years Settings and 
Children’s School Achievement 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
